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Introduction: Comparing atypical systems? 
The comparative literature on healthcare systems, policy and reforms has grown 
considerably during the last decade. The comparative studies aimed first at classifying 
the various types of healthcare systems into the three classical categories derived from 
the welfare state literature (Esping-Andersen 1990): Bismarckian social health 
insurances, national health services and private healthcare system. Second, in order to 
integrate reforms and changes, the comparative literature proposed renewed versions the 
established categories as illustrated by a “neo-bismarckian” category (Hassenteufel and 
Palier 2007). The classical subordination of healthcare systems to the logic of the 
welfare state model has, however, been criticizes for long, especially by the concept of 
the “healthcare state” (Moran 1999), which established the autonomous logic of 
healthcare developments in advanced democracies, a perspective that goes beyond the 
fact that healthcare constitutes a sector, delivering complex and highly qualified service, 
unlike most welfare schemes, like retirement and unemployment, which deliver 
financial benefits (Bamra 2005).  
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A new orientation started with the evidence that a growing number of national cases did 
not enter the established or revised categories. The description of new cases, in 
particular Asian healthcare systems (Gauld 2005), with different types of institutional 
arrangements and functioning, led to the conceptualization of a new category, the 
“national health insurance” (Lee et al. 2008), where the state centrally administers 
health care financing. In fact, recent research shows that all mature healthcare systems 
are mixed systems; they “have evolved in ways that blur the boundaries of the 
established typology”, shifting variously “the balance of power, the mix of instruments, 
and the organization principals of earlier models to yield distinct hybrids” (Tuohy 
2012a, p. 618 and 627). Growing hybridization is mainly seen as resulting from reforms 
or the international diffusion of policy receipts, both responding to the problem of cost 
containment, in terms of activity-based hospital financing, public management, quality 
assessment and more targeted intervention to secure access for underprivileged 
populations. However, as the French and Japanese cases will show, the mix results also 
from original institutional arrangements. Healthcare systems evolve not only under to 
external pressure, but incrementally according to domestic limits and opportunities 
(Steffen 2010a).  
 
Extensive reviews of the comparative literature have also been undertaken (Marmor, 
Freeman, and Okma 2005; Marmor and Wendt 2012; Tuohy 2012b). These studies 
conclude that the important comparative investment did not provide the expected 
results, especially as to the question whether the reforms and international transfers 
during the last three produced convergence or not. Two specific raisons may explain the 
unclear outcome. The first is a methodological problem. There is necessarily a trade-off 
between a large number of cases needed for the construction of models and theory that 
can be generalized, on the one side, and the necessity of in-depth studies providing 
sufficient contextual data for the understanding of complex systems (Mair 2008). The 
second problem is linked to the system of actors in each health care system. The “same” 
actors, such as trade-unions, employers-unions or government departments, may follow 
different strategies, aims and values, despite a similar institutional position (Marmor 
and Wendt 2012; Steffen 2010b; Steffen and Jobert 1994). Furthermore, the new 
politics to design reforms depend on “institutional entrepreneurs”, which are necessarily 
of different types varying with the national public policy regimes (Tuohy 2012a). 
 
Despite these methodological difficulties, a combined approach, taking into account 
complex evolutions, hybridization, and the aim of model constructing, has recently been 
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undertaken in a systematic way (Götze and Schmid 2013; Rothgang et al. 2010; Wendt, 
Frisina, and Rothgang 2009). It approach is based on the “hierarchy” between the three 
main dimensions of healthcare systems, placing governance in the dominant position, 
followed by financing and, last, service delivery. As a result, a new category has 
appeared, to which many, if not most advanced healthcare systems seem to correspond: 
it links strong public governance with the institutional framework of a social health 
insurance. Japan and France figure in this category of “statist social health insurances”.  
 
This paper compares two particularly complex healthcare systems, Japan and France, 
both little known. Language and complexity make access and comparing indeed 
difficult. Their classification in the internationally used models has so far been highly 
uncertain. Japan has been coined as a “hybrid model between SHI and NHI”, because of 
the massive involvement of the state in financing and its broad and strong state 
intervention on private sectors (Ikegami et al. 2011; Lee et al. 2008). France stands out 
by its specific combination of what the literature considers as contradictory and 
theoretically not conceivable, namely free choice and universalism (Steffen 2010a).  
 
This paper proceeds from a classical two-country comparative methodology, limited to 
two cases in order to gather the necessary contextualization. It compares two countries 
that seem similar when looking at the most common dimensions of financing and the 
extent of universal cover. Both countries are established democracies, and show a 
comparable level of economic development, two dimensions essential to health system 
development. These similarities provide a plausible comparative framework to observe 
how similar “policy problems” (Peters 2005) are addressed in their respective political 
and institutional context. The paper will insist on who governs cost-containment and 
how, with what impact on financing and service provision. These questions bring the 
relationship between the SHI and the state at the center of the analysis.  
 
The first part provides comparative statistics, the second outlines the institutional set-up, 
the third part analyses the main problems that have been addressed. The fourth and last 
part is devoted to the comparative assessment of the two cases and explanatory factors.   
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1 - The Japanese and French health systems at a glance 
Before analyzing institutional arrangements and reforms in the two countries, we made 
comparisons of selected critical statistics: social and health expenditures, size of public 
employment, and healthcare ressources. Although we tried to find best comparable 
indicators, due to inevitable heterogeneities in statistics of France and Japan, some 
statistics should be carefully interpreted. 
 
Social and health expenditures 
France has always spent more of DGP for social redistribution than Japan. The 
difference amounts to more than 10 percent, for comparable statistics. Differences in 
health expenditures were initially rather small between the two countries, but the growth 
between the 1980 and 2010 is much quicker in France than in Japan [Table 1].  
 
Table 1:  Social and Health Spending  
In % of GDP* 
France  
1980 
France  
2009-10 
Japan  
1980 
Japan  
2009-10 
Social spending* 20.8 32.07 10.2 22.4 
Health expenditure** 7.0 11.7 6.4 9.5 
Health per capita PPS $*** 1,031 3,974 857 3,034 
 Sources:  *OECD Social expenditure data,  **OECD Health data,   
 *** 1985 earliest available 
 
Concerning the financing of this expenditure, Japan has a larger public part, since 
decades, with even an increase of 0.4 % during the 2000s. Inversely, France privatized 
slightly over the last two decades; private spending increase by 1.6 % during the 2000s 
[Table 2]. A major difference between France and Japan exists in the way private 
spending is organized: it is mostly out-of-pocket payment in Japan, whereas 
complimentary health insurance (CPHI) covers the major part in France. Today, CPHI 
covers only a little more than 3 % of the expenditure in Japan, but nearly 15 % in 
France1. 
 
                                            
1 Those figures suggest privatization is easier in France since there is an institutional fitting for it, not in 
Japan. This French particularity is a traditional feature, not a reform result, but it serves today’s reforms: 
it allows to lower reimbursements, introduce entrance-fees and the like, and it allows raising more 
contribution, whilst maintaining a certain level solidarity within the private financing, because collective. 
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Table 2:  Public and private financing of Health Spending 
% of total health 
expenditure 
France  
2003 
France  
2009 
Japan  
2003 
Japan  
2009 
Public part (SHI +public 
authorities) 
79.2 77.6 79.8 80.2 
Private Complem. HI or 
similar 
13.9 14.8 3.3 3.6 
Private out of pocket 6.8 7.7 16.9 16.3 
Sources: OECD Health data 
  
Table 3:  Extent of Public Service 
2008 France Japan 
Public employment, share of total 
employment* 
21.9% 6.7% 
% of DGP for salaries* 13.3 % 6.5 % 
Public administration density**: Number 
of functionaries per 1,000 inhabitants 
88 
(2004:  94.2*) 
40 
(2004:  42.2*) 
Level of membership in trade unions** 
in public service: 
in private sector: 
 
15.2 % 
5 % 
 
43.2 %* 
17 % 
DGP per inhabitant, 2011, in PPP $*** 35.247 33.668 
 Sources: *OECD(2011) Government at a glance 2011. Figures are for 2008.  
 **CAS Paris, 2010,p 14 and 18.  ***World Bank Data 
 
Public Service 
The two healthcare systems operate in totally different environments, despite a 
comparable level of GDP per capita. Public sectors differ in size between the two 
countries. France appears as a heavily state-dependent society. More than 1 job out of 5 
has the state as employer, generally in lifetime position. Japan, on the contrary, is one of 
the OECD countries with a small public sector. In the both countries, public 
administration density is stable over 30 years, but it varys by more than one to two 
between them. Both tried to lower the number of functionaries, and succeeded to cut 
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respectively 5.5 % (Japan) and 6.8 % (France)2. France spends a lot of public money: 
13,3 % of its DGP to pay salaries, and another 32 % for redistribution via social policy 
(including the 10 % of public health expenditure). Second, the membership in trade 
unions varies very much. The French rate of membership in trade unions is only a third 
of the Japanese one, in the public as well as private sector3.  
 
These considerable differences in state-dependency, social organization, taxation and 
public spending do certainly condition the ways each country perceives and treats the 
problem of cost-containment and growing healthcare demands. 
 
Health ressources 
Compared to France, Japan has a bed-centered health care system. It has more than 
double beds for curative care, and even three times more for psychiatry. The average 
length of stay there is three times more than that in France. Nevertheless, the number of 
practicing physicians is less in Japan, whereas the number of nurses is higher, yet far 
from the proportion of bed numbers. The share of the pharmaceutical consumption 
within the total health expenditure is slightly larger in Japan. It remains to be clarified to 
what extent this is due to prices or volumes. 
 
These figures, however, should be carefully interpreted because of the different 
definitions of health resources. The statistical categories are not strictly comparable as 
to their content. Especially, the OCDE data does not provide any breakdown of the 
Japanese lengths of stay according to precise treatments, such as acute myocardium 
infarction or birth delivery. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the Japanese health 
care system is still heavily bed-centered compared to French one. The latter has 
succeeded in intensifying considerably its turnover rates for beds. 
  
                                            
2 This has been mainly done by not replacing departure for retirement, in the both countries. 
3 Raisons for the very low membership in trade unions in France, one of the lowest within the OEDC, are 
as follows: First, trade unions are ideologically deeply divided by ideology. Second, every worker 
benefits from trade-union success, without having to be a member and to pay membership. Third, trade 
unions are directly dependant on state subsidies, rather than on membership fees. A list dating from 1948 
recognizes five trade unions officially as « representative », list not up-dated according to election results. 
Source: Dominique Perrin, WWW.chalenges.fr (observateur) 
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Table 3:  Selected health resources 
Per 1,000 inhabitants (2011) France Japan 
Number of physicians 3,3 2.2 
Number of nurses 8.5* 10.1** 
Number of curative hospital beds 3.5 8.1 
Number of psychiatry bed 0.9 2.7 
Number of all beds 6.4 13.6 
Average length of stay, all beds, in days 5.7 18.2 
Pharmaceutical consumption, share of health 
expenditure 
16.0 % 20.8 % 
 Source: OCDE Health data, 2010 or latest 
 * all, including managing nurses.  ** Only practicing nurses 
 
 
2 – Institutional architecture and governance structures  
 
The Japanese and the French healthcare systems share a common origin, both in the 
Bismarckian social insurances implemented in Germany the 1880s. The conditions 
however in which the model was imported and adapted to domestic circumstances 
contrast strongly. In the Japanese case, the state organized the intellectual transfer in the 
context of modernization during the Meiji period. A political project similar to the 
original Bismarckian perspective, aiming at social peace with the working class and a 
healthy population, accompanied the Japanese interest for the German model. In France, 
the introduction of social insurance was a historical accident and controversial issue. 
The specific history explains many of the institutional particularities in each country.   
 
2.1 Institutional arrangements in France 
 
After World War I, the two provinces Alsace and Lorrain that had been under German 
authority and social security system, returned to France. This confronted the 
government with an uncomfortable choice, either deprive the returning population of its 
social rights or extend to the whole country an institution inherited from the enemy, and 
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which that did not fit the patterns of domestic social policy. The latter focused on 
voluntary membership in private non-for-profit mutualist societies, for those who could 
afford it, and public medical assistance for the poor delivered by local authorities 
(Hatzfeld, 1970). The law on social insurances was finally passed in 1928, but medical 
leaders and the mutualist societies together fiercely fought the health insurance included 
in it. They obtained a substantial revision; he new law passed in 1930 allowed doctors 
to set tariffs, prescribe, settle and organize practice as they saw fit, without any 
obligation to collaborate with public policy or authority. After 1945, when a renewed 
social security scheme was set up, in the context of Liberation and important communist 
influence, the new institution was seen as a victory of the working class and a 
laboratory for “social democracy”. The trade unions had a statutory majority in the 
governing boards, whilst the employers had to pay the major part of the contributions. 
When the 1967 reform corrected this asymmetry, the trade unions refused to 
“collaborate with the class enemy” and practiced systematic opposition. This situation 
lasted for three decades, until 1996, depriving the health insurance of developing 
capacities for cost control and management.  
Furthermore, when medical unions finally engaged in a National Medical Agreement 
with the health insurance (1970), with fixed tariffs, they only signed after the 
government had issued a “Solemn Declaration” guarantying that it would protect the 
independent practice of doctors (médecine libérale), and that the health expenditure 
would not be indexed on economic situation (Hatzfeld, 1963) (Text of Declaration). In 
the French context, the social health insurance appears as an institutional misfit, reduced 
to administrative reimbursement, transforming regulation and cost containment to an 
“ill-structured problem” (Simon 1973) and most critical policy issue.  
  
The health insurance is a unique national institution covering the entire population. 
Concurrence between funds is therefore impossible. For historical reasons, it is 
composed of three distinct branches: the main branch for employees, one for agriculture 
and one for independent professions, each covering also its respective pensioners. The 
state has always fixed the contribution (a percentage from work income), the benefit 
basket and most of the pricing (cf below).  
 
Access extended beyond the initial Bismarckian limits from the mid-1960s onwards, 
achieving universalism in the early 1980s. The payment system combines third party 
payment, applied in hospitals, laboratories and pharmacies, without necessarily 
following a public-private divide, and a direct payment system by the patient in 
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ambulatory care and in commercial private hospitals, especially the physician’s 
honorary. The direct payment system allows over-charging as well as over-prescription. 
Reimbursement is limited to the official tariff, but even for this official part it has never 
been complete, except for specifically defined heavy illnesses4. The gap has historical 
raisons: it assigns a “complementary” role to the pre-existing mutualist insurances5. 
Consequently, today 94 % of the population have a “complementary” private health 
insurance (CPHI), in addition to the statutory health insurance from which no-one can 
opt out. As non-for-profit organizations, the mutualist CPHI used to have the monopoly 
for complementary health insurance in France, until the European Union imposed free 
market and concurrence for insurances. However, as the mutualist organizations enjoy 
public trust in France, the market share for commercial insurance companies has 
remained limited. In 2010, they collected, mostly via collective employer-based 
contracts, 27 % of the premiums paid to PCHI (DRESS data, quoted by Bras and 
Tabuteau 2012, p 59).  
 
Tariff setting is a complex system. The ministry in charge of health sets fees for 
hospitals directly; prices for medicines are negotiated between the government and the 
producing companies; and tariffs for ambulatory care between the health insurance and 
the different professional unions, within the framework of the Medical agreement for 
private doctors and similar agreements for the various paramedical professions. In fact, 
pricing illustrates the dual architecture of the French system, with the institutional 
tension between the health insurance and the state, and the institutional frontier between 
ambulatory care and hospital care. The terms of the Medical agreement are negotiated 
every five years, with tariff-rounds each year. Although this is the competency of the 
health insurance, the government, whose final validation is necessary, often intervenes 
to favor higher or lower tariffs according to election agendas or lobby pressure.  
 
                                            
4 A list of thirty illnesses exists, for 100 % reimbursement of the official tariff by the 
statutory health insurance. In 2010, 16 % of the insured are concerned, representing 
63 % of the total reimbursement sum of the statutory HI (quoted by Palier, 6th ed. 2012, 
p. 35 and Bras/Tabuteau p.35: original data: Comptes nationaux de la santé, DRESS n° 
161/2011, later edition ?) 
5 Reimbursement by the public health insurance amounts to approximately 70 % for medical fees, 65 % 
for most medicines (variant from 15 % to 100 % according the “level of medical efficiency” of each 
medicine), and 65 % for most biological analyses. For severe illness reimbursement is 100 % for all items. 
The CPHI reimburse the charge non reimbursed by the public health insurance. A main difference 
between the CPHI is whether reimburse or not, and to what level the part of fees doctors over-charged 
compared to the official tariffs. 
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Hospitals are now financed according to their precise activity, with the same tariffs for 
public and private hospitals. The latter are of two kinds: non-for profit hospitals, which 
can "participate in the public service” and share the same rules than public hospitals, 
and commercial for-profit hospitals, which may overcharge the patient6. Hospital tariffs 
are fixed each year, for each “activity”, on the base of a complex combination of 
elements, including homogeneous groups of patients and of hospital stay, all data 
originating from the medical computing systems in the hospitals. A complex national 
method exists for the continuous surveillance of how costs are generated in the three 
different types of hospitals, to provide national average costs. Operating such tools 
requires the active collaboration of hospital physicians and directors. The ministry is 
therefore not independent from the professional elites, especially those working in the 
prestigious public hospitals linked to university. 
 
The 1996 reform introduced, for the first time, a mechanism to limit the health budget. 
Since then, Parliament votes an annual law on the financing of the social security 
system, which fixes the allowed growth rate for the health insurance expenditure, and 
the allocation of the available resources to the main sectors of healthcare. The High 
Council on the Future of Health Insurance (HCAAM) has an alert function in case of 
imminent over-spending of the voted “National Objective for Health Insurance 
Spending” (ONDAM). Despite these measures, over-spending has been systematic and 
rather heavy, except the years following a reform aiming at cost containment (1997, 
2004, 2009), but improvement seems now on the way (Table 5).  
  
                                            
6 The profit rate of commercial hospitals is rather low in France: in average 1.9 % in 2010 compared to 
the annual chiffre d’affaires, with a maximum of 3.1 % in 2005 (DRESS, Etudes et Resultats, n° 798, 
mars 2012, p. 1 and 4). Commercial hospitals account for 10 % of full-time beds and 20 % of day-care 
beds; their main activity is standardized short stay and day chirurgical intervention (Chevreul et al. 2010, 
p 185). 
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Table 5:  The French Health budget (ONDAM) 
Year Growth rate voted 
by Parliament, in % 
Real growth rate  
in % 
1997 1.7 1.5   
1998 2.5 4.0 
2001 2.5 5.6 
2002 3.2 7.1 
2004 4.4 4.9 
2006 1.8 3.1 
2007 1.3 4.2 
2008 2.5 3.4 
2010 2.9 2.6   
2011 2.8 2.9 
2012 2.9 2.9 expected 
2013 2.7 proposed  
  Source: Cours des Comptes 2012 
 
The evolution reflects the changing relationship between the social health insurance and 
the state. A constitutional change was necessary in 1996 to introduce a parliamentary 
annual vote on the social security budget. The latter is proposed by the government and 
then voted by the political majority, which is generally the same than the party in 
power. Two reformist trade unions, the employers union and the federation of mutualist 
PCHI supported the reform. Yet, this last tentative to save the model of “social 
democracy” failed in terms of cost containment. In 2002, the employers left the 
Bismarckian institution. What follows is the complete take-over by the central state. 
 
The 2004 law (13th August) changed the governance structures of the health insurance. 
It abolished the governing boards of all funds (national, regional and local), 
transforming these former executive bodies into simple advisory bodies without any 
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decision power. The directors of the funds, up to then appointed by these former boards, 
merely according to local political equilibriums, are now nominated by and responsible 
to a centralized hierarchy: the general director of the national fund of the main branch of 
the health insurance. The highest political level nominates the holder of the position: the 
Cabinet (not the Health ministry). He has hierarchical authority over all local funds and 
their directors. His competency has been enlarged and includes the coordination 
between the three branches and with the PCHI. The reform responds to a political 
choice of the employers’ union to focus henceforth only on those social policies that 
have a direct link to employment, and to the previous integration of social budgets into 
the ambit ministry in charge of public finance (Bras and Tabuteau 2012, p 45). It ends 
the ambiguous relationship between the health insurance and the state. 
 
Two conclusions can be draw from the French institutional arrangements. First, the 
unclear relationship between the state and the social health insurance, the dual 
regulatory system, separate for hospitals and ambulatory care, and the politicians’ 
respectful attitude towards “médecine libérale” delayed regulation and cost 
containment. Second, patients paid, and continue to pay for the government’s hesitation, 
in terms of high contributions, incomplete reimbursement and medical over-charges7, 
and in terms of unequal territorial distribution8 of physicians, and shortage of 
physicians in the near future9. 
 
2.2 Institutional arrangements in Japan 
 
Learning from German experiences, the state imported the idea of social health 
insurance and gradually developed its statutory health insurance system with, of course, 
its own modifications (Yoshihara and Wada 2008). With voluntary health insurances 
                                            
7 The 1980 Medical Agreement created a new category for doctors who wanted to systematically 
overcharge, the so-called “Sector II”. Entry to sector II was eventually regulated, from 1990 onwards, but 
new possibilities for over-charging are in discussion. In 2012, in average un out of four physicians is 
enrolled in sector II and entitled to overcharge, with important disparities between disciplines: 10.4 % of 
GP and 41.4 % of specialists, up to 77 % of surgeons). 
8 Medical installation is concentrated in big cities, near medical faculties, and in the south of France, 
following the hours of sunshine per year (Comptes nationaux de la santé 2011, Série Statistique, 2012 
(172) : 143-144. 
9 Confronted with institutional limits to regulate, the government introduced as regulatory tool a severe 
limitation of the number of medical students, already in 1971, with the support of the medical unions 
(médecine liberale) and the health insurance. With retirement of the numerous generations of doctors, and 
the actual policy of closing small hospitals, shortage is now starting in rural and other disadvantaged areas. 
Admission numbers are now slowly augmented since the end of the 1990’ (forthcoming book, paper 
Marc-Olivier Déplaude 2012). 
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already existing, organized by industries, the state first introduced compulsory 
employment-based health insurance (EBHI) in the 1920s. Then the state added a new 
type of statutory health insurance, community-based health insurance (CBHI), which 
was operated by municipalities and spread countrywide, for agricultural, self-employed, 
unemployed people and others who were not covered by the EBHI in the 1930s 
(Ministry of Health and Welfare 1976).  
 
In the 1950s, after World War II, the government increased the covered population by 
making more employees eligible for the EBHI and amending the expansion of 
eligibility for the EBHI, and by obliging all municipalities to establish and manage 
community–based health insurance (Ikegami et al. 2011). In 1961, the universal 
coverage was declared: it became compulsory for all people, except those receiving 
social assistance10, to enroll in a statutory health insurance.  
 
The institutional arrangement of the Japanese health policy has originated from this 
historical dualism of the EBHI and the CBHI. There have been complex regulatory and 
financial relationships between the national and local governments and statutory health 
insurers. For the EBHI, the government works as an insurer, a funder, and a regulator 
(Tatara and Okamoto 200911) Up to 2008, the government was the largest insurer in the 
EBHI that covered workers and their dependents at small- and medium-sized companies. 
The management of the insurance is now devolved to a special agency, the National 
Health Insurance Association, under the supervision of the government. The 
government allocates funds from the general budget to the insurance, and it regulates 
insurance societies that are established by large companies to provide the EBHI to their 
workers and their dependents. Every municipality operates the CBHI for their residents 
who are not enrolled in the EBHI. Municipality is a democratic institution with elected 
representatives, and a mayor or village head (Councils of Local Authorities for 
International Relations -CLAIR- 2005). The national government, municipalities, and 
recently also Kens (Prefectures) grant subsidies to the CBHI, through again complex 
rules and formulas. The national government also subsidizes local governments to 
stabilize their funds.  
 
                                            
10 Social assistance: funded by tax and including provision of medical services. 
11 The former was called the Government-Operated Health Insurance; the latter the Society-Operated 
Health Insurance. 
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With complex financial arrangements, the division between the two types of insurance 
has made it difficult to develop policies, particularly funding policies to meet the 
increasing demand for care. There have been strong objections of insurance societies 
based on large companies against cross-subsidies between insurances for undermining 
their autonomy. A policy response to this objection was the establishment of the 
“Health Care Programs for the Aged” in 1982, which introduced a common pool of 
funds for health care for the aged people, by collecting money from insurers as well as 
from the national and local governments.  
 
The dualism also seems to have influenced private funding of health care through once 
heterogeneous out-of-pocket payments. There were huge differences in out-of-pocket 
payments in the 1960s: employees covered by the EBHI paid minimal co-payments and 
those covered by the CBHI initially paid half of total fees. Such differences can explain 
why complementary private health insurances have not developed in Japan, but instead 
“supplementary” insurances as additional parts in life insurance contracts12. 
 
Healthcare provision is organized via a complex and accidental public-private mix. 
Mixtures differ between regions. One city may have two public (national and city) 
hospitals; the other may only have private hospitals. Different regulations can be 
applied to different types of providers. For example, the Ministry of Health, Labor and 
Welfare makes regulations on all hospitals; while the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communication issues rules on local government hospitals; and, finally, the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Science, Sports and Technology on university hospitals. Meanwhile 
there have been no geographical boundaries or gate keeping for patients. In urban areas, 
providers compete with each other, with the same price rules.  
 
The political representation of citizen is weak in the governance of the complex health 
care system. Bureaucratic structures are fragmented, as illustrated by the case of 
hospital regulations mentioned above (Kodate 2012). With quickly changing 
governments and the complexity of the policy field, most issues but funding are 
discussed in numerous councils under the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 
involving policy officers at the Ministry, representatives from relevant organizations 
                                            
12 It usually pays a lump sum when insured persons are hospitalized over a defined period and/or 
diagnosed with cancer or any of a number of other specified chronic diseases. More than 70 percent of 
adults hold this kind of insurance (Life Insurance Association of Japan, 2012 : Life Insurance Business, 
2011. Tokyo : Edition of the Life Insurance Association of Japan). 
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(such as medical associations), experts in relevant academic fields, and recently 
someone who is expected to represent the voice of patients.  
 
The strongest part of the state regulation has always been on pricing, and on the benefit 
basket to be paid for by the statutory health insurance.  The government decides the 
payment rules applied to all statutory health insurance every two years. This decision 
includes the definition of the overall rate of expenditure increase, and decisions on 
detailed payment rules for services. Because of those subsidies from the general budget, 
as we wrote above, the Treasury Department and the ruling party, in addition to insurers 
and health care professions are involved in decision-making on the overall rate of 
increase (Ikegami and Anderson 2012; Ikegami and Campbell 2004). Furthermore, 
arguments on general budgets such as the necessity for decreasing public debts have 
also been influential in making payment rules. The payment rules are considered to be a 
policy tool to implement the government’s goals. Extra charges by physicians or other 
providers are strongly prohibited by law, except for some services designated by the 
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. Those exceptions include private or 
semi-private hospital rooms, drop-in services at facilities with appointment systems, and 
« services under development ». Medical liberalism has been limited and controversial 
(Rodwin 2011) 
 
3 - Policy problems and tools 
This part selects the most salient problems addressed through reforms or other policy 
action. The issues are not comparable at first sight, but deliver a comparative 
assessment of how two different systems deal with most relevant problems. 
 
3.1 Problems addressed and tools in the French reforms 
 
French reforms started in the early 1980’, with limited hospital budgets. Many reforms 
followed, but did rarely produce the expected results. The reform process is a 
step-by-step one, with effective implementation since the mid-2000s. Three policy 
problems have been addressed, rather successfully: providing new finance; securing 
access; regulating, restructuring and managing the service offer. 
 
Since cost containment proved difficult, new finance was essential. During the 1990’, 
new compulsory contributions have progressively been introduced, applicable to other 
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than work income. In 1996, the social contribution of employees was replaced by an 
income-tax-like “general social contribution” (GSC)13. The latter applies to all income, 
including lottery winning, social benefits, capital income, etc., with various levels of 
taxation ranging from 3 to 10 %. The employers’ contribution is still taken exclusively 
from the pay roll (7.5 %). A specific contribution for the “reimbursement of the social 
security debt” was also introduced (0.5 % on all income, payable since 1997 and up to 
2017). The mix in financing by work-based and tax-like contributions illustrates the 
ambiguous institutional model of the French health insurance. 
 
In addition, new private finance has been mobilized, especially via the 2004 reform. 
Reimbursement rates were lowered, or modulated for medicines according to their 
medical effectiveness, and various entrances tickets were introduced or augmented. This 
policy has enlarged the market for the complementary private health insurances. To 
reimburse these additional private participations, they have augmented their premiums. 
However, they are not allowed to reimburse certain of these new copayments, those 
introduced to limit consumption. This reveals the ambiguous role of CPHI: they have 
become a complementary tool in the government’s regulatory policy, for slowing down 
demand and shifting costs towards private finance. 
 
Prior to these copayments, access for the poor population was secured. The scheme for 
“universal medical cover” was introduced in 2000. This law replaced the old medical 
assistance delivered by local authorities by free affiliation to the health statutory health 
insurance, for anyone with income below a defined threshold14. A second step added 
free affiliation to a freely chosen complementary private health insurance, the 
contribution being paid by a public fund, specially created to pool the financial 
subsidies from all public and private HI funds. The final step has provided public 
subsidies to people whose income is up to 35 % above the threshold, in order to help 
them buy a private complementary health insurance. The public-private mix in the 
French institutional arrangements is particularly evident here. 
 
Both reform directions, high contributions and access for all, corresponds to a large 
majority in public opinion, which is regularly surveyed since 2000 on behalf of the 
                                            
13 The question whether the GSC was a “tax” or a “social contribution” was brought before the law 
courts, which made contradictory judgments (if it was a tax, it had to be included into and treated under 
the tax law). Finally the European Court of Justice defined it as “contribution” (add source…) 
14 The threshold is (2012) 661 € income per month for a single person, 992 € for a couple, plus 265 € 
each child or other dependent person.  
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government: 39 % are favorable to paying even higher health insurance contributions to 
maintain the actual level of benefits, 77 % are favorable for access to healthcare for all 
without distinction of their contributive status15.   
 
Regulation was made effective by new institutional arrangements, organized by the 
major 2009 law. The latter transformed the 1996-created regional agencies for hospital 
planning into “Regional HEALTH agencies”, with all-compassing competency over the 
entire health sector, each agency in one of the 22 regions. All previous public 
administrations for healthcare, hospital planning, prevention, public health, and part of 
the social administrations have been absorbed by these new Regional health agencies 
(RHA)16. The latter have thus taken over the competency of the regional level of the 
health insurance, and gained authority over the long term and the so-called 
“medico-social” (homes for elderly, handicapped, addicts, heavy behavioral cases). 
These care institutions are financed by local authorities, and run or owned, most of 
them, by private non-for profit organizations. The longstanding local and national 
policy networks between elected politicians and civil society organizations are now 
obliged to negotiate their projects, interests and budgets with the RHA. 
  
The ARS are bodies of the central state administration with regional competency. A 
long debate proceeded to their creation concerning the question of the best equilibrium 
between national policy and the agencies’ autonomy in promoting it within and 
adapting it to each region. The solution has been a national coordination body (Conseil 
national de pilotage) and a plural-annual contract signed between the ministry in charge 
of health and each agency fixing objectives and resources. The directors are nominated 
at highest government level, directly by the Cabinet. Their main task is restructuring 
and stirring the service offer: closing small hospitals or overcapacities in care units, 
foster merges, new technology, and public-private partnerships). They have powerful 
tools: each care institution has be negotiate a plural annual project and its budgets with 
the RHA, on the base of precise projects defining objectives, resources and 
appropriateness to geographical needs. All activities and institutions, public as well as 
private, have to obtain prior authorization from the RHA. An opertional and already 
much used tool are the “groupements de cooperation sanitaire”, collaborative projects 
with legal status and proper management structures. These “groups” need to be 
                                            
15 “Baromètre DRESS”, Etudes et Résultats, n° 821, December 2012) 
16 The total represents 9,000 functionaries, in terms of “equivalence full-time employment”, now 
attributed to the RHAs (Cours de compte 2012, p. 235). 
18 
 
validated by the RHA and can concern what ever is useful: partnerships between 
hospitals, whether public or private, for sharing technical equipment, territorial care 
networks, or redistribution of beds, or medical and non-medical joint activities, or 
collaborative projects between hospitals, long term and ambulatory care, or prevention. 
 
Last but not least, the internal governance of hospitals has been reformed, together with 
the modes of financing. Like in the health insurance funds, the former governing boards 
of the hospitals (traditionally chaired by the local major), have been transformed into 
consultative body. The general director of the hospital, nominated by the ministry in 
charge of health, has full authority and chairs of the new “Directory”. The formerly 
rather autonomous hospitals departments have been joined into big “pools”, each 
headed by a managing doctor, who has to elaborate a development project for the pool 
and negotiate it as an contract with the General Director, who in turn has to present a 
plural annual project for the entire hospital to the RHA, which after negotiation and 
signature become a binding contract. The large contracting on all levels, together with 
the financing according to activity leaves no choice but to engage into new public 
management. This does not exclude the doctors, especially not the elite of medical 
professors heading the pools, but foots on the professional interests. The hospital 
directors have become a most powerful professional group, the elite of the “public 
hospital service”, one of the three sections of the French functionaries.  
 
Much has been achieved during the last ten years, mainly a total revision of power 
structures, in order to operate cost containment, which is not supported neither by public 
opinion nor the healthcare workers and their trade unions. The change had to be 
organized with the support of high rang professionals that can identify with it. It should 
be recalled here that the prestigious hospital directors, who enter their training after a 
highly competitive entry exam, not only work in public hospitals, but also in the RHA, 
the ministry and private hospitals. 
 
3.2 Problems addressed and tools in Japanese reforms 
 
In the last two decades, Japan carried out incremental policy changes rather than a big 
bang reform (Klein 1991). The exception was the establishment of the Long-Term care 
provision in 2000 (Campbell and Ikegami 2003), which has enabled the delivery of 
home help services by for-profit companies, and has expanded the demand their supply.  
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A major policy problem in the last two decades is unquestionably how to sustain 
funding for resource allocation to supply healthcare for increasing demands due to 
changes of citizens’ expectations and to demographic changes. Within the existing 
health care system, health care expenditure is expected to increase markedly. A recent 
government projection estimated the medical care expenditure for the aged will increase 
4.3 percent per year in average from 2010 to 2025, while the total medical care 
expenditure, for the entire population, is expected to raise 2.3 percent per year (Bureau 
of Insurance Ministry of Health 2010). This expansion of health spending has been 
problematized as a part of the rising costs for social security. 
 
The following policy measures have been taken around this problem: raising additional 
funds within the existing institutions, development of a common pooling of funds with 
risk- and income-adjustments between insurers, and “Tekisei-ka” 17 , which means 
accountable healthcare costs.  
 First, measures have been taken to increase funds from the three major sources: 
contributions, tax, and user charges. A clear rule for funding has been introduced by the 
Health Care Insurance for the “Old-Old” people: a compulsory public insurance for 
those aged 75 and over was established in 2008. It increased transparency and 
horizontal equity in financing as well as opened a window to increase contributions 
from the Old-Old (Izumi 2010)18 . To raise funds from the general budget, the 
government led by the Democratic Party of Japan passed an act that increases the 
Consumption Tax rate from 5 % to 8 % in April 2014 and to 10 % in October 2015. The 
tax will be earmarked for social security benefits, including health care and pensions, 
and policy measures to address declining birth rates. User charges have been gradually 
increased in the last three decades. Co-payment rates for beneficiaries of the EHBI were 
increased from 10 % to 20% in 1998, then to 30 percent in 2005. User charges for the 
elderly, for whom care was once free (in the 1970s), have also been increased. 
Consequently, the proportion of patient’s cost-sharing in the national health expenditure 
statistics increased from 10.5 % in 1982 to 14.8 % in 200319.  
                                            
17 The Japanese term “Tekisei-ka” means making appropriate, reasonable, valid or right, whilst leaving 
open the ways to achieve it. Therefore, the word is often used by politicians and high officials to persuade 
relevant actors. Here we use the word “accountable” with a kind of simplification. 
18 Fifty, ten, and forty percent of health care benefits of the Health Insurance for the Old-Old shall be 
funded, respectively, by tax, contributions and transfers from other statutory health insurers. The average 
monthly contribution increased slowly from 5,332 yen in 2008 to 5,561 yen in 2012 (Ministry of Health, 
Labor and Welfare 2012). This rule has increased particularly transfers from other insurers, which has 
raised a political concern. 
19 The figure slightly decreased to 13.9 in 2009. 
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 Second, the Health Care Insurance for the Old-Old not only maintained a 
common pool of healthcare funds for the Old-Old, but also introduced risk adjustment 
between insurers. Despite the strong objections of the insurance societies based on large 
companies, this (for Japan) new mechanism was introduced by the government though 
the adjustment is limited to the insured people between 65 and 74 years old.  
 Third, in response to the argument that healthcare expenditure should be made 
more efficient, the government has introduced a National Plan for Making Healthcare 
Cost Accountable in 2008. The plan set two major areas for action. One is promoting 
healthy behavior by increasing the utilization of personal preventive services, including 
screenings for diabetes and hypercholesterolemia; the other is making health care 
delivery more efficient and decreasing the number of beds (Ministry of Health Labor 
and Welfare 2008).  
 
The cost of health care has been well contained in Japan compared to the OECD 
countries, particularly because of the all-payer price setting mechanism (Hashimoto et 
al. 2011; Ikegami and Anderson 2012). So far, public opinion polls have indicated 
a majority preference for keeping contributions within the actual limits and 
provide standard treatment. Only high income groups, which are a minority, 
would prefer more choice against higher contributions (Health Policy 
Institute 2009; Murata 2012). However, concerns about the “quality of care” and 
“physicians shortages” arise with anecdotal news on cases of malpractice or 
failure-to-access. Furthermore, increase of the old-old population is entailing changing 
demands for healthcare and a more ethical delivery of care for dying patients. These 
issues are now seriously debated. 
 
Those concerns lead to the perspective and the search of an efficient and appropriate 
local delivery system. Among local governments, the Kens (Prefectures) have been 
gradually emerging as a key player to achieve such goals. First, some statutory health 
insurances have established an operating unit at the Ken level. The National Health 
Insurance Association established a branch for every Ken. The new Health Insurance 
for the Old-Old is operated by purposefully established insurers at the Ken level. In 
addition to that, activities and results of the plans for making healthcare costs 
accountable are used as incentives to those insurers. All Kens are now required to make 
their own plans for making healthcare costs accountable.  
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4 - Comparative assessment  
The comparative results can be summarized following a classical plan, first the 
assessment of each case, distinguishing the main achievements and the still unsolved 
problems. The second part concentrates on the comparative assessment and proposes 
explanatory factors of the differences and similarities between the two national cases. 
This preliminary paper provides evidence to argue that the Japan as well as France, 
despite their important differences, when analyzed within their respective environment 
and evolution, are best classified as “statist social health insurance” systems.    
 
For the French case, the main reform achievements have been: 
1) New and rather sustainable finance has been provided, sharing the burden 
between public and private payers, whilst limiting negative impacts on access or 
quality.  
2) The central state has finally taken over the Social Health Insurance, stepwise but 
mainly through the 2004 and 2009 reforms. The SHI continues to exist as an 
institutional facade, for raisons of lack of other legitimacy and institutional 
commodity (the practical function of reimbursement, and new control 
functions).  
3) Cost containment as well as NPM is finally under way. The operational center is 
the centrally organized institution of “Regional Health Agencies”. Their 
powerful tools are contracting, authorizations and budgets. 
4) The process of modernizing is an extension of the “public hospital service logic” 
to the entire health service sector. Implementation foots on the professionelle 
collaboration of the “public hospital elites”.  
5) Gate keeping has finally been installed, in 2004. It is efficient although 
voluntary, because based on the direct financial interest of the patients.  
 
The main unsolved problems in the French case are, without surprise, linked to the 
ambulatory care sector dominated by “médecine libérale”: over-charging, bad 
geographical distribution and a foreseeable shortage of doctors in disadvantaged 
territories. Neither reforms nor incentives have succeeded so far in implementing on 
large scale the strict respect of medical recommendations, the much advertised 
integrated care paths, or the rational distribution of doctors. What would be needed is 
the rewriting the political contract between the private doctors’ unions and the 
government (Barbier, Guilloux, and Le Guilly 2010; Tabuteau 2010), which would 
mean yet another major redistribution of power. 
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For the Japanese case, the main reform achievements have been as follows: 
1) By making the once varied co-payment rate into a common rate across all 
statutory health insurances, all statutory health insurances have the same 
co-payment rate, i.e. 30 % of the total fees in general. 
2) The state has continuously and incrementally expanded virtual cross-subsidies 
between statutory insurers, particularly those between community-based health 
insurers and employment-based health insurers. It finally introduced a formal 
and explicit cross-subsidy (or a risk- and income-adjustment mechanism) 
between insurers through the 2008 health care reform.  
3) The establishment of the new Health Care Insurance for the “Old-Old” people 
has opened the window for increasing contributions from the aged population 
without further legislations.   
4) A part of personal preventive services have been moved from the public health 
system to the health insurance system, in order to achieve a higher level of 
utilization.  
5) Thought the 2008 health care reform, the state has been developing the 
Ken-level governance structure, including financial arrangements within 
insurance and subsidies available for Kens, planning of health care delivery, and 
modification of price levels. 
6) The reform has also established the authority of the state to collect detailed 
information, such as activities of hospitals, which is critical to measure 
performances of each Ken in the NPM and develop incentives to influence 
provider behaviors. 
 
The main unsolved problems in the Japanese case concern funding sustainability.  
This « problem » is raised, and growing in the context of containing social expenditure, 
in order to decrease the massive public debts while maintaining the competitiveness of 
industries. The lack of clear principles on who should pay, and how much for healthcare, 
can be regarded as the hidden problem in the Japanese politics of healthcare reform. 
Meanwhile, the managerial responsibility for “citizen health insurance” still exists 
within municipalities. Therefore, the Ken-level governance structure is to be developed 
further to include these responsibilities.   
 
Although the question of how to increase efficiency of healthcare has been only 
qualitatively discussed, arguments for cost-effectiveness evaluations, which are 
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essentially quantitative, have emerged in policy making in the last couple years. 
Furthermore, with the expansion of aged population and accompanying increase of 
mortality, an expanding demand for more coordinated ethical care is expressed. This 
would require transformation of palliative care in terms of places of care, human 
resources, and more financing. Another open question is whether gate-keeping can be 
stronger regulated in the near future, together with the official qualifications for general 
or family practitioners, which has been developed only recently, by the newly created 
professional bodies of GPs. Before, the gate-keeping function was technically difficult, 
if not impossible to organize, because of the lack of an official category and recognition 
of these front-line physicians. 
 
Deregulation on extra billings by providers has been a controversial issue during the 
entire last decade, but yet to be decided (Ikegami 2006). The policy has been supported 
by « pro-choice » policy advocates around the government, and physicians working at 
hospitals with highest reputation; but it has been objected by the Japan Medical 
Association, and by health policy scholars arguing that it would undermine the universal 
coverage.  
 
The comparative assessment shows slow-pace change in Japan, geared toward 
renewed governance structures with the goal to lower bed capacities, whilst the French 
case witnesses the late but cumulating effects of many reforms, centered on the public 
hospitals and extending from there over the entire health system. The types of changes 
observed in both countries combine the renewing governance and of decision making 
structures, accompanied by changes in delivery structures, both with lesser amplitude in 
Japan, and in the French case with varying amplitude according to the sub-sectors of the 
system. The changes in both countries constitute a mix of “first” and “second-order” 
changes in Hall’s classification of reforms (Hall 1993). They are often limited 
incremental changes in the way the various tools are being used, but techniques and 
policy instruments are also changing. Wendt, Frisina and Rothgang (2009) proposed a 
scale that aims to integrate, and even measure change. They note that modest changes 
can prepare more important shifts. Using these authors’ scale, the observed changes in 
Japan and France correspondent to a mixture of “internal change of levels” and “internal 
system change”, the latter especially in France. 
 
Both cases show growing, multiple and strong State intervention, in a formally still 
social health insurance model. The two cases should therefore be considered as a “statist 
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social health insurance” model (Götze and Schmidt, 2013). The new state regulation is 
concentrated at an intermediate level, between the national government and many local 
interests: the Ken in Japan, the Région en France. The political system however makes 
these regional levels more statist in France, and more regional in Japan. The distance to 
local lobbies and politicians therefore varies between the two cases. 
 
Conclusion 
The main differences can be clearly identified. First, the spending level differs 
considerably: high spending in France, lower spending in Japan. Both options are firmly 
supported by public opinion. The steady growth of health expenditure enjoys a large 
and stable public consensus in France, just as lower spending is in Japan.  
 
Second, whilst the two countries have well trained policy professionals, who may be 
called “programmatic elites” (Genieys and Hassenteufel 2012; Genieys and Smyrl 
2008)20, in the top level of ministries and public administration, they need political 
support for getting their programs voted and implemented. In Japan they depend on 
other actors from within the circle of power, including politicians, business leaders, 
distinguished professionals, and media persons (Schmidt 2005). In France, in the case of 
health policy, they need active support from sectoral elites. 
 
Concerning explaining factors, Olivier and Mossialos noted already that “a single 
explanatory theory would not account for all of the health sector developments that have 
occurred within any individual country, let alone across (…) different countries with 
diverse culture, histories, institutions and interest (Oliver and Mossialos 2005: 25)”. In 
our comparative study, the explaining factors are of the same type for the two healthcare 
systems, but have to be drawn from different theories: – the propensity for high or only low taxation (political culture); – the level of centralized or fragmented governance (institutions); and  – the capacity of senior policy officials to mobilize effective support for their 
programs (actors, politics).   
 
                                            
20 A “programmatic elite” means “a group of actors with direct access to policy-making positions that is 
self-consciously structured around a common commitment to a concrete and coherent programmatic 
model for a given policy sector” (Genieys and Smyrl 2008: 76). To what extent senior officials in Japan 
can be called “programmatic elites” remains open, no empirical research being available on Japanese 
elites with this concept so far.  
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In other words, public preferences, veto points and the channels through which 
divergent interests can be negotiated and aggregated explain the two cases. If France 
will succeed its cost containment from now onwards, as it may be possible, it will be 
because of the now-existing central institution that operate this aggregation locally, the 
Regional Health Authorities. Whether Japan will succeed in converting its many beds 
into adapted facilities for the many frail elderly remains still a question, but it would 
need to be via the emerging Ken level. 
 
The future is open. The historical legacy in both countries can provide opportunity as 
well as handicaps for necessary reforms. The private complementary health insurance in 
France allows bridging the gap between high public expectation and public cost 
containment, whilst the weak regulation of medécine libérale remains the still negative 
part of path dependency. Weak political representation in the Japanese health policy 
may make it possible to avoid too much politicization of healthcare. The complex 
mixture of funding in Japan can lead to flexible responses to economic downturns. 
Services for changing demands concerning the aging population can be promptly and 
flexibly developed, with little new regulations on already competitive healthcare 
providers if satisfactory funding will be allocated.   
 
With changing policy environments, however, legacy and opportunities may change. In 
France, the liberal conception of physicians’ work may finally be questioned. Internal 
changes within the medical profession may favor changes (feminization, changing 
division of labor between professions, new professional skills around medical 
management, etc.). If Japan opts to leave people raise additional funds privately for 
increased demands, rather than to make the public system raise them, then 
complementary and supplementary health insurance linked to the existing statuary 
health insurance may develop in the near future. If physicians in Japan want to gain 
more power or money with increased global and local demands, they may want a 
Japanese version of “medécine libérale” for their interest. Finally, despite or because of 
successful state regulation, it may ultimately occur that healthcare systems that are 
institutionally prepared to develop a more interwoven public-private mix may have an 
advantage in search for sustainability. 
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